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NOTES
COPPER WELD CORP. v. INDEPENDENCE TUBE CORP.:
AN END TO THE INTRAENTERPRISE
CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE?
INTRODUCTION
In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., I the United States
Supreme Court held that a parent corporation is incapable of con-
spiring, within the meaning of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act,2 with its wholly owned subsidiary. This holding reversed a line
of Supreme Court cases utilizing the "intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine" to treat commonly owned or controlled corporations as
separate legal entities which could be held liable for conspiring to
restrain trade under the Sherman Act.
Courts and commentators criticized the intraenterprise conspir-
acy doctrine long before Copperweld. Despite this dissatisfaction with
the doctrine, questions remain concerning the scope of the Cop-
perveld decision and the desirability of rejecting the doctrine out-
right instead of creating a more refined intraenterprise test. This
Note reviews the Supreme Court cases that developed the in-
traenterprise conspiracy doctrine3 and explores possible interpreta-
tions of these cases. 4 The Note discusses criticisms of the doctrine 5
and evaluates an alternative intraenterprise test developed by sev-
eral circuit courts. 6 After discussing Copperweld's factual and legal
background, 7 the Note examines the Court's rationale for overturn-
1 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). This section provides in part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make
any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared
to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony....
Section I liability requires an illegal conspiracy between two or more parties. Illegality
of the agreement turns on a finding of restraint of trade. This Note concerns only the
threshold determination of whether a plurality of parties exists. The plurality of parties
requirement distinguishes § 1 from § 2 because § 2 proscribes unilateral monopolistic
behavior. For the text of § 2, see infra note 51.
3 See hifra notes 12-29 and accompanying text.
4 See i'fra notes 30-48 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 49-52, 54-56 & 60-64 and accompanying text.
G See ifra notes 56-75 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 76-96 and accompanying text.
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ing the doctrine 8 and suggests that Copperweld does not fulfill its
stated rationale. The Note further argues that although Copperweld
overrules the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine when applied to a
parent and its wholly owned subsidiary, lower courts remain free to
apply, and should apply, a modified version of the doctrine when
the parent owns less than one hundred percent of the subsidiary.9
Thus, Copperweld does not spell the end of the intraenterprise con-
spiracy doctrine.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Yellow Cab: Introduction of the Intraenterprise
Conspiracy Doctrine' 0
A conspiracy in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act re-
quires an agreement between two or more parties to restrain
trade. I t In United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 12 the Supreme Court found
section 1 liability where one individual owned or controlled sepa-
rately incorporated conspiring companies.' 3 The alleged conspir-
acy consisted of agreements between a taxicab manufacturer and
several taxicab operators, all of whom were controlled by a single
individual. 14 The defendants maintained that they could not be lia-
8 See infra notes 97-118 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 152-58 & 173-78 and accompanying text.
10 Yellow Cab was not the first case to address a conspiracy between units of a
corporation. In United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941), the Seventh Circuit rejected a single entity defense
presented by General Motors, whose divisions were then vertically integrated, separately
incorporated subsidiaries. The court stated: "[The corporations cannot] enjoy the
benefits of separate corporate identity and escape the consequences of an illegal
combination in restraint of trade by insisting that they are in effect a single trader." Id.
at 404. For a discussion of vertical integration, see infra note 15.
1' 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Antitrust liability for a conspiracy in restraint of trade may
arise under either of two tests. First, a restraint may be "per se" illegal if it is so inher-
ently anticompetitive that an analysis into underlying motives, purposes, or effects is
unnecessary. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (tying
arrangement whereby party agrees to sell product on condition that buyer purchases
different product is illegal per se). Second, a restraint may be illegal under the "rule of
reason" when an analysis into all relevant circumstances reveals that its tendency to
suppress competition outweighs legitimate interests. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (price fixing during business hours when grain
market was not in session by Board of Trade not illegal; all agreements restrain competi-
tion, so courts should examine history, rationale, and facts relevant to restraint).
12 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
13 Id. at 227.
14 Morris Markin controlled the majority of shares in the Checker Cab Manufactur-
ing Corporation and served as its president and general manager. Id. at 221. Markin
also owned all outstanding shares in Cab Sales and Parts Corporation. Id. at 221-22. In
addition, Markin controlled, either personally or through other corporations, numerous
taxicab companies in cities around the country. Id. at 222. In the Chicago area alone,
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ble because the vertically integrated subsidiary corporations consti-
tuted a single entity which was inherently incapable of forming a
multiparty conspiracy.15
The Yellow Cab Court rejected the single entity status defense,
ruling that unlawful restraints "may result as readily from a conspir-
acy among those who are affiliated or integrated under common
ownership as from a conspiracy among those who are otherwise in-
dependent."' 16 The Court adverted to the Sherman Act's concern
with substance rather than form, concluding that common corporate
ownership and control did not preclude section 1 liability.' 7
Although previous Supreme Court decisions had held affiliated
corporations liable under section 1 of the Sherman Act,' 8 Yellow Cab
formally introduced the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine. The
Yellow Cab holding strongly influenced subsequent Supreme Court
and lower court decisions. Indeed, one commentator characterized
the Court's language as having taken on a "talismanic quality."' 9
Courts and commentators questioned both the scope of the Court's
holding in Yellow Cab20 and the validity of the intraenterprise con-
spiracy doctrine.21 Despite this criticism, Yellow Cab had a substan-
tial impact on later intraenterprise conspiracy cases. 22
Markin held the beneficial controlling interests in three of the largest taxicab companies.
Id. at 222-23.
15 Id. at 227. Vertical integration exists when an enterprise owns or controls
subunits that perform different levels of production, such as the manufacture, distribu-
tion, financing, sales, or service of a given product. A vertically integrated business may
gain efficiency from the division of labor and specialization in this organizational struc-
ture. Businesses vertically integrate by using unincorporated divisions, separately incor-
porated subsidiaries, or some combination of these methods. See R. GIVENS, Ar'rrrUsT:
AN ECONOMIC APPROACH § 8.01 (1984).
16 332 U.S. at 227.
17 Id. (citing Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360, 377
(1933), in which the Court stated, "The restrictions the [Sherman] Act imposes are not
mechanical or artificial"; "the Anti-Trust Act aims at substance.").
18 In United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944), the Court
held that affiliated film distributors with interlocking ownership conspired in violation of
the Sherman Act. In companion cases decided within a year of Yellow Cab the Court held
that the practices of affiliated film theatres constituted a conspiracy in violation of § 1.
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United
States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948). Schine cites both Yellow Cab and Crescent Amusement for the
proposition that affiliated status does not immunize corporations from Sherman Act lia-
bility. 334 U.S. at 116.
19 Areeda, Intraenterprise Conspiracy in Decline, 97 HARV. L. REV. 451, 458 (1983) (re-
ferring to Yellow Cab Court's language that "common ownership and control of the vari-
ous corporate appellees are impotent to liberate the alleged combination and conspiracy
from the impact of the Act." 332 U.S. at 227).
20 See infra notes 30-48 and accompanying text.
21 See inf a notes 49-52, 54-56 & 60-64 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
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B. Yellow Cab's Progeny: Reaffirmation of the Intraenterprise
Conspiracy Doctrine
The Supreme Court expressly reaffirmed the intraenterprise
conspiracy doctrine in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc.23 In Kiefer-Stewart, the Court addressed an agreement between
two wholly owned subsidiaries of Seagram to fix retail liquor
prices.24 The subsidiaries maintained that their status as part of the
Seagram organization precluded liability. In rejecting this argu-
ment, the Court cited Yellow Cab for the proposition that "mere in-
strumentalities of a single manufacturing-merchandizing unit"
could conspire unlawfully. 25 The Court suggested that the in-
traenterprise conspiracy doctrine is "especially applicable" when
conspirators hold themselves out to be competitors. 26
The Supreme Court also applied the intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.27 In
Perma Life, the Court overturned the court of appeals's alternative
holding that the companies, as parts of a single business entity,
23 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
24 The agreement took place between Calvert Sales and Seagram Sales, both of
which were wholly owned subsidiaries of Seagram of Indiana. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Jo-
seph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 182 F.2d 228, 229 (7th Cir. 1950), rev'd, 340 U.S. 211
(1951). Kiefer-Stewart Company, a wholesale liquor distributor, sought damages result-
ing from resale price limits imposed upon Indiana liquor wholesalers by defendants.
Kiefer-Stewart, 340 U.S. at 212.
25 340 U.S. at 215.
The Court relied upon Kiefer-Stewart in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,
341 U.S. 593 (1951). In Timken, the Court rejected an argument that an American par-
ent corporation holding one-third ownership interest in a British subsidiary and one-half
interest in a French subsidiary was exempt from § 1 liability because the parent and its
subsidiaries operated as ajoint venture. Id. at 598. The Court held that anticompetitive
agreements between legally separate corporations could not be justified "by labeling the
project a 'joint venture.' " The Court suggested that "[plerhaps every agreement and
combination to restrain trade could be so labeled." Id. Joint venture status has also
been alleged as a defense to § 1 conspiracy in professional sports antitrust litigation,
usually with little success. See, e.g., Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 449-52 (1957);
Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 619-21 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977);
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 484 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal.), redon
other grounds, 634 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1980); see also North Am. Soccer League v. NFL,
670 F.2d 1249, 1256-58 (2d Cir.) (necessity of league affiliation to successful production
and marketing of member's businesses does not warrant treating league as single entity),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
26 340 U.S. at 215. The Court did not explain the relevance of the subsidiaries'
holding themselves out to be competitors. Presumably, the Court was concerned about
possible damages incurred in reliance on the apparent independence of corporations.
See H. BLAKE & R. PITOFSKY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST LAw 438 (1967) (no-
tion of expanded antitrust liability where affiliated companies adopt competitive posture
consistent with old line of cases under § 5 of FTC Act); cf. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Antitrust
Division, Antitrust Guide for International Operations 11-14 (1977) (even if alleged
conspirators hold themselves out as competitors, focus on whether they were originally
such, were created by a common parent, or are under 100% common ownership).
27 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
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could not illegally conspire to restrict competition in the muffler
business.28 The Supreme Court ruled that because these corpora-
tions "availed themselves of the privilege of doing business through
separate corporations, the fact of common ownership could not save
them from any of the obligations that the law imposes on separate
entities." 29
C. The Strength of the Court's Adherence to the
Intraenterprise Conspiracy Doctrine
Despite the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of Yellow Cab's in-
traenterprise conspiracy doctrine in Kiefer-Stewart and Perma Life, the
strength of the Court's adherence to the doctrine remained uncer-
tain. Language in Yellow Cab suggests that the Court's holding
rested on its perception of an anticompetitive acquisition, rather
than a conspiracy.30 Furthermore, Yellow Cab's progeny did little
more than reiterate the earlier holding, without providing new anal-
ysis of the doctrine.3 1 Finally, the Court declined to apply the doc-
trine in more recent intraenterprise conspiracy cases.3 2
The Yellow Cab Court focused its antitrust attack on the original
corporate acquisitions, rather than on the resulting enterprise's
structure.3 3 Under a narrow interpretation, the case simply holds
that if a series of acquisitions leads to an unreasonable restraint of
trade, common ownership will not preclude section 1 liability.3 4
A restricted interpretation of Yellow Cab diminishes the signifi-
28 Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 141-42. The parent, International Parts Corporation, con-
spired with its wholly owned subsidiaries to fix retail prices and condition the sale of
mufflers. Perma Life, one of International Part's franchisees, sued to recover damages
incurred because of these arrangements. Id. at 135.
29 Id. at 141-42 (citations omitted).
30 See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
33 The Court's language suggesting this interpretation reads: "The theory of the
complaint ... is that 'dominating power' over the cab operating companies 'was not
obtained by normal expansion... but by deliberate, calculated purchase for control.'"
Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. at 227-28 (quoting United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 57
(1920)).
34 As commentators have noted, "This is hardly a startling or disputable proposi-
tion and is far different from saying that affiliated corporations, because of the fact of
separate incorporation, are in all circumstances subject to section 1." Handler & Smart,
The Present Status of the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 23, 29 (1981)
(footnote omitted). According to another commentator, "That unlawful merger was the
theory of the case is clear from the case's ultimate resolution." Areeda, supra note 19, at
458. On remand, the district court found that the defendant taxicab companies had not
been illegally acquired. United States v. Yellow Cab, 80 F. Supp. 936 (N.D. IlM. 1948),
afy'd, 338 U.S. 338 (1949). The Supreme-Court subsequently affirmed that result. 338
U.S. 338 (1949).
Eellon, Cab's precedential forcc, however, is not limited to acquisition cases. Despite
the Court's failure to analyze the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine in later cases, see
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cance of later Supreme Court cases applying the intraenterprise
conspiracy doctrine because those cases rely solely on Yellow Cab's
precedential value for support. For example, the Perma Life Court
states the rule without further analysis.3 5 Furthermore, alternative
explanations relying upon antitrust grounds other than intraenter-
prise conspiracy can form the basis for each of the post-Yellow Cab
decisions, 36 with the exception of Kiefer-Stewart.37
Supreme Court decisions after Perma Life also call into question
the strength of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine.3 8 In Sunkist
Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Products Co., 39 the Court de-
clined to apply Yellow Cab to an alleged conspiracy between Sunkist
and two affiliated agricultural cooperative corporations. 40 The
Court found no section 1 violation "even though [the cooperatives
had] formally organized themselves into three separate legal enti-
ties." 4 ' The Court observed that "[tihere is no indication that the
use of separate corporations had economic significance in itself or
that outsiders considered and dealt with the three entities as in-
dependent organizations. '4 2
infra text accompanying notes 35-36, the reaffirmation of Yellow Cab in these nonacquisi-
tion cases extends the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine beyond Yellow Cab's facts.
35 See Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 141-42.
36 In Timken, for example, American Timken did not have any control over the busi-
ness conduct of either British or French Timken. United States v. Timken Roller Bear-
ing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 311-12 (N.D. Ohio 1949), modified, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). Thus,
while it would be incorrect to characterize the corporations as unrelated parties, they
might be considered independent for intraenterprise conspiracy purposes. See also P.
AREEDA, ANTrrRUsT ANALYSIS 337 (1974) (Timken intraenterprise holding unnecessary
because "defendant's acquisition of its shares in British Timken was probably illegal" as
perfection of 20 year old unlawful agreement between the originally independent British
Timken and American Timken). In Perma Life, the Court itself suggested an alternative
holding on the basis of illegal agreements between the defendants and franchise dealers,
including the plaintiff. 392 U.S. at 142. Although their compliance was somewhat co-
erced, the franchise dealers nevertheless acquiesced to the defendant's restrictive
franchise agreements.
37 Commentators generally regard Kiefer-Stewart as the one case in which antitrust
liability can only be explained by reference to the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine.
See, e.g., Areeda, supra note 19, at 459 & n.22. But see Willis & Pitofsky, Antitrust Conse-
quences of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 20, 45 (1968) (Kiefer-Stewart can be
understood as simply a case of coerced resale price maintenance between plaintiff and
defendant).
38 See E. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw POLICY AND PROCEDURE 233
(1984).
39 370 U.S. 19 (1962).
40 Twelve thousand citrus growers formed Sunkist. Exchange Orange was a wholly
owned subsidiary of Sunkist. The members of a third corporation, Exchange Lemon,
were also members of Sunkist, but some Sunkist members were not involved with Ex-
change Lemon. Id. at 20-21.
41 Id. at 29.
42 Id. One commentator suggests that the Court in Sunkist "meant to fashion an
exception to intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine for agricultural cooperatives." Areeda,
supra note 19, at 460-61 & n.33 (noting the interpretation offered in Columbia Metal
1156 [Vol. 71:1151
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The Supreme Court also declined to find a conspiracy in United
States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank.43 Although the Court cited
Yellow Cab in arguing that corporate interrelationships do not deter-
mine potential antitrust liability,44 the Court permitted "the sharing
of expertise and information" 45 between a bank and pseudo-branch
offices in which it owned five percent interests46 despite stringent
state restrictions against branch operation. 47 The Court, distin-
guishing the situation from one in which "independent competitors
hav[e] no permissible reason for intimate and continuous coopera-
tion and consultation," found no section 1 conspiracy." '48
These later Supreme Court cases do not overrule Yellow Cab
and its progeny. They do, however, vitiate the intraenterprise con-
spiracy doctrine's vitality. Coupled with the possibility of a restric-
tive interpretation of the Yellow Cab cases, the doctrine's decline has
encouraged critics who challenge the doctrine's wisdom.
D. Shortcomings of the Intraenterprise Conspiracy Doctrine
A major criticism of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine is
that the doctrine does nothing to promote competition or otherwise
advance the purposes of the Sherman Act.49 Corporations routinely
make legitimate business arrangements through the use of unincor-
Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 33 & n.49 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978)). This interpretation is plausible in light of § 1 of the Cap-
per-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1982), which confers certain antitrust exemptions
upon such organizations. Professor Areeda also points out, however, that "the Court
has in other cases taken pains to construe special cooperative legislation narrowly ......
Areeda, supra note 19, at 461 (footnote omitted).
43 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
44 Id. at 116.
45 Id. at 114.
46 Id. at 92. In addition to the five percent ownership by Citizens Bank, the bank's
employees and officers also owned considerable stock in the "branches."
47 Id. at 118. The Court noted that the Georgia antibranch law "amounted to a
compulsory market division" which the bank's multiple ownership effectively defeated.
Id.
48 Id. at 113. The Court's approach in Sunkist and Citizens may be viewed as a transi-
tional step between Yellow Cab and Copperweld. In Yellow Cab and its progeny, the Court
focused on the legal status of the entities and ignored their economic relationship. In
Copperweld, the Court considered economic factors to the exclusion of legal ones. See
infra notes 141-50 and accompanying text. Arguably, Sunkist and Citizens permit courts
to treat corporations as legally separate only after economic analysis reveals them as
such. Under this approach, these cases serve as a precursor to the Ninth Circuit's single
economic unit test described at infra notes 56-74 and accompanying text.
49 See Handler & Smart, supra note 34, at 24. For other criticisms of the doctrine,
see Areeda, supra note 19; Handler & Smart, supra note 34; Kempf, Bathtub Conspiracies:
Has Seagram Distilled a More Potent Brew?, 24 Bus. LAw 173 (1968); McQuade, Conspiracy,
Multicorporate Enterprises, and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 41 VA. L. REV. 183 (1955); Rahl,
Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REV. 743 (1950); Stengel, Intra-Enteiprise Con-
spiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 35 Miss. LJ. 5 (1963); Willis & Pitofsky, supra
note 37.
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porated divisions. Such corporations are treated as discrete, single
legal entities which are immune from liability under section 1 of the
Sherman Act.50 These corporations are subject to antitrust liability
only if they become large enough to constitute a monopoly under
section 2 of the Sherman Act.5' Arguably, a parent corporation with
a wholly owned subsidiary is no different from a corporation com-
prised of unincorporated divisions.
Critics endorsing the corporate division analogy argument
point to language in Yellow Cab to support their position: The Sher-
man Act is "aimed at substance rather than form." 52 These critics
agree with this principle, but argue that Yellow Cab and its progeny
distorted its meaning. The Yellow Cab Court used this phrase to jus-
tify disregarding common corporate ownership or control in favor
of focusing on the economic realities forming substantive antitrust
violations. Critics claim that Yellow Cab and its progeny exaggerated
substance (the restraint of trade) and ignored form (the de facto
unity of a corporate enterprise). The critics argue that these cases
thus proscribe any interference with market competition without
first requiring that a plurality of independent actors be present.
Proponents of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine counter
that its abandonment would leave an undesirable gap in antitrust
law. Without the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine, corporate ar-
rangements which harm competition but do not rise to the level of
monopolistic behavior would go unfettered solely because the cor-
porations have common ownership or control. Neither section 1
nor section 2 would apply to such arrangements. Proponents of the
doctrine argue that Congress did not intend to leave such a gap in
the Sherman Act.53
Gaps have, however, become established in antitrust common
law. For example, an arrangement between a corporation and its
unincorporated division cannot create an illegal conspiracy, even if
it produces anticompetitive effects. 54 Furthermore, officers and em-
50 See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
51 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). This section provides: "Every person who shall monopo-
lize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire.., to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony ......
52 Eellow Cab, 332 U.S. at 227.
53 The definition of a "person" under the Sherman Act includes both an individual
and a corporation. 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1982). The legislative history of the Act, however,
contains no explicit discussion of the ramifications of utilizing this definition to pro-
scribe conspiracies between interrelated corporations. Proponents of the intraenter-
prise conspiracy doctrine must therefore rely solely on a plain language interpretation of
the statute.
54 See, e.g., H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244 (5th
Cir. 1978) (unincorporated division cannot conspire with corporation even though sepa-
rate books kept, because not separately incorporated); Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger,
1158 [Vol. 71:1151
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ployees of the same company, who make agreements on the com-
pany's and not their own behalf, are not considered separate
persons for the purpose of section 1 of the Sherman Act.55 Critics
of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine point to these recognized
gaps in the Sherman Act to refute the argument that the intraenter-
prise conspiracy doctrine is necessary to close a perceived gap in
antitrust law.
E. Lower Court Modifications of the Intraenterprise Doctrine
The leading lower court modification of the intraenterprise
conspiracy doctrine is the "single economic unit," or "SEU," test
adopted by the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. 56 This test in-
volves examining numerous factors concerning the corporation, its
subsidiary, and their operations to determine whether their separate
incorporation is economically significant or is a mere formality. An-
Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 205-06 (5th Cir. 1969) (corporation cannot conspire with unincorpo-
rated division even though latter is assumed name under which corporation does busi-
ness, because division is not a separate legal corporate entity); Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 83-84 (9th Cir. 1969) (reversible
error to treat unincorporated division as separate entity capable of conspiring with cor-
poration even though separately incorporated before), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970);
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 284 F.2d 599, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (charge that
corporation conspired with unincorporated division constitutes charge that corporation
conspired with itself), rev'd on other grounds, 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
55 See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 284 F.2d 599, 603 (D.C. Cir.
1960) (claim of conspiracy between corporation and employees just as unsound as claim
of conspiracy between corporation and unincorporated division), rev'd on other grounds,
368 U.S. 464 (1962); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914
(5th Cir. 1952) (corporation cannot conspire with employees because they are corpora-
tion's agents and corporation cannot conspire with itself), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925
(1953); see also H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244 (5th
Cir. 1978) (exception to general rule that corporation cannot conspire with own em-
ployee when employee has individual stake in achieving object of conspiracy).
56 The circuits vary in their approaches to the doctrine. The Third Circuit has con-
tinued a full application of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine. See, e.g., Columbia
Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 33 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d
72, 81 & n.16 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978). The First and Fifth Cir-
cuits have also adopted an absolute intraenterprise rule. See, e.g., H & B Equip. Co. v.
International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244-45 (5th Cir. 1978); George R. Whitten,
Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 557 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1004 (1975). The Second Circuit has moved towards the SEU test developed by
the Ninth Circuit. See Fuchs Sugars & Syrups Inc. v. Amstar Corp., 602 F.2d 1025, 1030-
31 & n.5 (2d Cir.) (economic realities must be examined to determine whether principal
and agent are capable of conspiring), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917 (1979). A district court
within the Second Circuit belatedly applied the SEU test one day after the Supreme
Court issued its Copperweld decision. Reborn Enters., Inc. v. Fine Child, Inc., 590 F.
Supp. 1423, 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (economic realities reveal no capacity to conspire
between parent and wholly owned subsidiary), aft'd, 754 F.2d 1072 (2d Cir. 1985). The
Fourth Circuit has affirmed a lower court's utilization of a control-based test similar to
the Ninth Circuit's SEU test. See Windsor Theatre Co. v. Walbrook Amusement Co., 94
F. Supp. 388, 396 (D. Md. 1950), aff'd, 189 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1951).
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titrust liability is possible only if the court finds the parent and the
subsidiary to be meaningfully independent. If the court finds no
meaningful independence, the companies are treated as a single
economic unit.
In Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 57 the Ninth Circuit upheld a find-
ing of no conspiracy between a parent and its wholly owned subsidi-
ary, both of which were newspaper publishers. The plaintiff, an
independent distributor, claimed that a conspiracy in violation of
the antitrust laws occurred when both corporations terminated their
independent dealers and shifted to an employee distribution net-
work. 58 The Ninth Circuit relied on the lower court's finding that no
conspiracy had taken place 59 and added a discussion of the distinc-
tion between separate legal entities and separate economic enti-
ties. 60 The Knutson court considered separate incorporation to be
but one factor when deciding whether concerted action between dis-
tinct economic entities constitutes a violation of antitrust law. The
court noted that separate incorporation "may be significant in an
antitrust sense or it may be only a technicality, a byproduct of deci-
sions with no antitrust impact."' 6' The court concluded that actual,
rather than legal, corporate structure determines whether the court
will treat the arrangement as one entity or as separate units.62
57 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977).
58 Knutson, 548 F.2d at 799-801. The parent corporation, Daily Review, Inc., pub-
lished a daily morning paper and a daily evening paper, as well as a "greensheet" adver-
tising circular. Its wholly owned subsidiary, Bay Area Publishing Co., published a daily
morning paper and a periodic evening paper. Id.
59 Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 1346, 1359 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977).
60 See Knutson, 548 F.2d at 801.
61 Id. at 802.
62 Id. The Ninth Circuit undertook a factual analysis and found as a matter of law
that the defendant corporations should be treated as a single entity for antitrust pur-
poses. The court considered the following facts conclusive in its finding that the defend-
ants constituted a single economic unit: (a) The subsidiary was wholly owned by the
parent; (b) The controlling shareholder of the parent was the president of both newspa-
per companies and the publisher of all five newspapers; (c) Both corporations had the
same individuals in charge of important operations, including circulation; (d) The al-
leged individual co-conspirators were either employees or officers of both firms; (e) The
three daily papers significantly shared news, features, editorials, and advertising; (f) All
composition work for the common features was done at one plant; (g) The corporations
did not compete or hold themselves out to be competitors. Id. at 802.
Two subsequent Ninth Circuit decisions refer to the single economic unit test. In
the first, Mutual Fund Investors, Inc. v. Putnam Management Co., 553 F.2d 620 (9th Cir.
1977), the defendant was a vertically integrated organization consisting of the Putnam
Management Company and its subsidiaries. Mutual Fund Investors, Inc., a competitor,
alleged a conspiracy among the Putnam corporations to restrain trade. The Ninth Cir-
cuit relied on the district court's finding that, as a matter of law, no fact finder could
reasonably infer a conspiracy from the evidence. Id. at 625-26. Nevertheless, the circuit
court reiterated its Knutson dictum, stating that "[s]eparate incorporation, like the lack of
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In Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa Corp.,63 the Ninth Circuit held
that unilateral action on the part of a parent corporation, even
though implemented by separately incorporated subsidiaries, can-
not violate section 1 without a plurality of economic agents. 64 In Las
Vegas Sun, a newspaper sued the Summa Corporation and six
Summa-controlled hotel-casinos for terminating advertising con-
tracts with the paper. 65 The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's
ruling that Summa's decision to cancel its contract and Summa's di-
rection to its hotel-casinos to do likewise was unilateral action be-
yond the scope of the section 1 prohibition.66 The Ninth Circuit
thereby modified the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine by examin-
ing the economic realities of the situation 67 to determine if a corpo-
ration's control over its subsidiaries elevated the group to single
economic unit status.
The Seventh Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's SEU test in
Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp.68 In Photovest, the court reversed the
district court's finding of a section 1 conspiracy between Fotomat
and its wholly owned subsidiary Fotomat Labs, Inc. 69 The Photovest
court found that legitimate business reasons motivated Fotomat
Labs to incorporate separately.70 The court further based its hold-
ing on factors indicating that Fotomat and Fotomat Labs operated
intraenterprise competition, is not dispositive of the question, but only one factor in the
calculus." Id. at 626.
In the second, Harvey v. Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc., 589 F.2d 451 (9th Cir.
1979), a gasoline retailer whose supplies were terminated during the 1973 gasoline
shortage sued a gasoline wholesaler with six wholly owned subsidiaries. Id. at 452. As in
Knutson and Mutual Fund, the Ninth Circuit relied on the lower court's finding that no
conspiracy had occurred. The Ninth Circuit went on to observe that no conspiracy
would be possible because an officer of the defendant wholesaler made the termination
decision, and officers in the subsidiary corporations merely complied with that decision.
Id. at 457.
63 610 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 906 (1980).
64 Las Vegas Sun, 610 F.2d at 618.
65 Id. at 617. The advertising contracts provided for a pool of $500,000 prepaid to
the Sun for the use of any of Summa's hotel-casinos. Howard Hughes, Summa's owner,
made the advance in return for a favorable editorial policy. Summa, however, became
dissatisfied with its editorial treatment by the Sun. When the pool was nearly depleted,
Summa ordered all hotel-casinos under its control to cancel existing Sun advertising and
to purchase no new advertising from the Sun. Id. at 616-17.
66 Id. at 618. Although the Ninth Circuit recognized the Supreme Court's repeated
holdings reaffirming the intraenterprise doctrine, the court considered Mutual Fund,
Knutson, and Harvey sufficient precedent for an exception when separate incorporation is
a mere formality rather than a practical reality. Id. at 617-18.
67 See supra note 62.
68 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
69 Photovest, 606 F.2d at 727. Fotomat and Fotomat Labs sought to deceive and
coerce Photovest into using a print processing plant from which Fotomat received prof-
its. Fotomat aimed to keep Photovest within the Fotomat system and, ultimately, to ac-
quire Photovest. Id. at 726.
70 The court deemed separate incorporation a legitimate attempt to "minimize po-
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as one company. 7' Thus, by examining the realities of the overall
enterprise, the Photovest court determined that Fotomat and Fotomat
Labs constituted one economic entity.
The Eighth Circuit applied the SEU test in Ogilvie v. Fotomat
Corp.72 In this action, independent Fotomat franchisees alleged that
Fotomat conspired with Fotomat Labs to eliminate the plaintiffs as
competitors by setting up Fotomat-owned franchises in the same
markets. 73 Employing an analysis very similar to the Seventh Cir-
cuit's Photovest opinion, the Eighth Circuit in Ogilvie found no capac-
ity to conspire between Fotomat and Fotomat Labs.74
The circuit courts' adoption of the SEU test as a modification of
the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine set the stage for the Cop-
perweld litigation. The Copperweld suit was brought in a district court
within the Seventh Circuit. The district court, pursuant to the Sev-
enth Circuit's direction in Photovest, applied the SEU test.7 5
II
COPPER WELD CORP. V. INDEPENDENCE TUBE CORP.
A. Factual Background
The Copperweld litigation arose out of a series of incidents fol-
lowing the Copperweld Corporation's 1972 purchase of Regal
Tube, an unincorporated division of Lear Siegler.76 Copperweld
placed the Regal assets in a newly formed Pennsylvania corporation
named Regal Tube Company.77 As part of the sale, Lear Siegler
agreed not to compete with Regal and not to allow any of its subsidi-
aries to so compete anywhere in the United States for a period of
five years. 78
tential for labor relations friction which might arise from the disparity in benefits be-
tween employees of photo processing labs and existing Fotomat personnel." Id.
71 Id. at 726-27. The court considered such factors as the overlap of the executive
management of Fotomat and Fotomat Labs; the absence of corporate offices for Foto-
mat Labs; the calculation of the subsidiary's profit-related compensation by reference to
the profitability of the parent; and the consolidation of the two companies for the pur-
poses of tax returns and financial information statements. Id.
72 641 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1981).
73 Id. at 583-84.
74 Id. at 590.
75 See infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
76 See Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310, 314-15 (7th
Cir. 1982), rev'd, 467 U.S. 752 (1984). From its formation in 1955 until 1968, Regal was
a wholly owned subsidiary of C. E. Robinson Company, which manufactured structural
steel tubing for use in heavy equipment, cargo vehicles, and construction. In 1968,
Robinson sold Regal to Lear Siegler, Inc., a California-based manufacturer. Id. at 313.
77 Id. at 313. Regal continued to manufacture steel tubing in Chicago, but shared
Copperweld's headquarters in Pittsburgh.
78 Id.
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David Grohne, the president of Regal from 1968 to 1972, 79 re-
mained with Lear Siegler after Regal was sold to Copperweld. In
May of 1972, Grohne formed his own steel tubing business, Inde-
pendence Tube Corporation.80 In December, he ordered a tubing
mill from Yoder of Cleveland for 1973 delivery.8 '
Copperweld and Regal management sought legal advice about
whether Grohne's action in creating Independence constituted a vi-
olation of Lear Siegler's purchase agreement with Copperweld.
Counsel for Copperweld and Regal suggested that although an in-
junction might be available to prevent Independence's use of any of
the "know-how, technical information, designs, plans, drawings,
trade secrets or inventions of Regal" purchased from Lear Siegler,
the noncompetition agreement did not prevent the new
enterprise.8 2
Copperweld and Regal sent letters to all parties with whom
Grohne attempted to deal, warning that Copperweld would take all
steps possible under the terms of its purchase agreement to protect
its assets in Regal.8 3 Copperweld maintained that the letters' pur-
pose was to prevent third parties dealing with Independence from
developing reliance interests that might later make a court reluctant
to enjoin Independence's activities. The letter sent to Yoder caused
the supplier to back out of Independence's purchase order for a tub-
ing mill.8 4 Although Independence subsequently purchased a tub-
ing mill from another manufacturer, Yoder's cancellation delayed
commencement of business for nine months.8 5 In 1976 Indepen-
dence filed suit in federal district court against Copperweld, Regal,
Copperweld's Chief Executive Officer, and Yoder. The complaint
alleged in part that the parent and subsidiary had conspired against
Independence in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.8 6
B. District and Circuit Court Treatment
The complaint chiefly alleged a section 1 conspiracy between
Copperweld and Regal.8 7 The district court applied the Seventh
79 Grohnejoined Regal in 1959. He became vice president and general manager in
1968 and served as president when Regal was an unincorporated division of Lear Sie-
gler. Id.
80 Id. at 314.
81 Id.
82 Id. Independence lured eight key employees away from Regal. Regal and Cop-
perweld regarded this not only as corporate raiding, but also as an attempt to obtain
Regal's proprietary information and know-how. Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 757, 758 n. 1. The complaint also charged the defendants
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Circuit's version of the SEU test,88 instructing the jury to look for an
economically significant, rather than legally formal, separation be-
tween Copperweld and Regal.89 On special interrogatories, the jury
found that Copperweld and Regal had conspired in violation of sec-
tion 190 and awarded Independence $2.5 million in damages, which
the court trebled to $7.5 million.9 1
Copperweld and Regal appealed to the Seventh Circuit, argu-
ing that in light of the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Photovest they
lacked the capacity to conspire as a matter of law.92 The Seventh
Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Photovest, stating that "Photovest rep-
resents a reasonable and pragmatic approach to the intra-enterprise
conspiracy problem . . . . 93 The court upheld the jury's implicit
finding of capacity to conspire by holding that the district court had
complied with Photovest and that sufficient evidence supported the
jury's finding of fact.94
C. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Copperweld to reexam-
ine the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine.95 Reversing the Seventh
with monopolization in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act and breach of contract
against Yoder. 691 F.2d at 315.
88 Copperweld, 691 F.2d at 319 (noting congruence of district judge's instructions in
Copperweld and Photovest test); see Photovest, 606 F.2d at 725 (applying SEU test).
89 Copperweld, 691 F.2d at 319. The judge instructed the jury that:
The rule is that a parent like Copperweld and a subsidiary like Regal are
capable of combining or conspiring together unless they are operated in
such a way as to, in effect, constitute just one company .... If you find
from the evidence that Regal Tube Company is not sufficiently distinct
from Copperweld as an economic entity, then you must consider them as
a single person ....
Id. The jury also received nine specific instructions pertaining to the capacity of Cop-
perweld and Regal to conspire. Id.
90 Id. at 320.
91 Id. at 315.
92 Id. at 315-16.
93 Id. at 318.
94 Id. at 319-20. The jury heard evidence that: (1) when Copperweld purchased
Regal from Lear Siegler, "Copperweld intended Regal to 'keep its ongoing business and
keep serving the market and customers it was already serving' "; (2) the Regal acquisi-
tion "established Copperweld in an entirely new line"; (3) Regal's management had
"real autonomy in both day-to-day and policy decisions"; (4) "Regal's operating man-
ager's compensation was based primarily on Regal profitability"; and (5) until 1979,
Regal had a separate sales force, a separate clientele, and made its own arrangements
with suppliers of equipment and raw materials--"a fact relevant to the ability of [Cop-
perweld and Regal] to bring pressure to bear on more people if they worked together
than either could alone or than both could if Regal were a full-fledged division." Id. at
320.
95 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 759 (1984).
Counsel for Copperweld argued in its petition for certiorari that the intraenterprise con-
spiracy doctrine was in "disarray among the circuits." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9,
Jan. 28, 1983, Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
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Circuit and overturning the Yellow Cab line of cases, the Court held
that Copperweld was incapable of conspiring with its wholly owned
subsidiary as a matter of law.96
Chief Justice Burger wrote the Copperweld opinion for the five
justice majority. 97 The Chief Justice minimized the significance of
Yellow Cab and its progeny by arguing that prior Supreme Court in-
traenterprise cases, with the exception of Kiefer-Stewart, could be ex-
plained without reference to the intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine.98 The majority found that Yellow Cab merely stands for the
proposition that "a pattern of acquisitions may itself create a combi-
nation illegal under [section] 1, especially when an original anticom-
petitive purpose is evident from the affiliated corporations'
subsequent conduct." 99 The finding of an illegal conspiracy in Yel-
low Cab was irrelevant because "the original acquisitions were them-
selves illegal."' 0 0
The Copperweld majority noted that subsequent intraenterprise
cases merely reiterated the Yellow Cab holding without further analy-
sis. t 01 The Court concluded that "the [intraenterprise conspiracy]
doctrine has played. . . a relatively minor role in the Court's Sher-
man Act holdings."' 02
The Court's eschewal of Yellow Cab's precedential force cleared
the way for a complete reexamination of the intraenterprise conspir-
acy doctrine. The Court first noted the widespread criticism of the
doctrine by commentators. 0 3 The Court rephrased the central criti-
cism: "[T]he doctrine gives undue significance to the fact that a sub-
sidiary is separately incorporated and thereby treats as the
concerted activity of two entities what is really unilateral behavior
flowing from decisions of a single enterprise."' 0 4 To support this
criticism, the Court cited cases holding corporate officers, employ-
96 467 U.S. at 777.
97 Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined the Chief Justice.
Id. at 778.
98 Id. at 759-66. The Court echoed similar attempts by critics of the intraenterprise
conspiracy doctrine. See, e.g., Areeda, supra note 19, at 458-59; see also supra notes 30-47
and accompanying text.
99 467 U.S. at 761 (footnote omitted).
100 Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
101 Id. at 764 ("Later cases involving the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine do lit-
tle more than cite Yellow Cab or Kiefer-Stewart, and in none of the cases was the doctrine
necessary to the result reached.").
102 Id. at 766. Although the Court correctly noted that later cases did little more
than rely on Yellow Cab for precedential support, the Court failed to separate this sub-
stantive concern from the precedential weight of Yellow Cab's progeny. The Court
should have undertaken its substantive analysis of the Yellow Cab line of cases only after it
resolved the stare decisis issue. See also supra note 34.
103 467 U.S. at 776 n.12.
104 Id. at 766-67.
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ees, and unincorporated divisions incapable of conspiring with their
corporations.10 5 Reasoning by analogy, the Court held that a parent
and its wholly owned subsidiary should not be treated as a plurality
of actors merely because of their separate incorporation. The Court
concluded that "[a] parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a
complete unity of interest," 10 6 and likened the situation to a "multi-
ple team of horses drawing a vehicle under the control of a single
driver"' 1 7 because the entities, though separate, have common
objectives and one corporate consciousness.
The Court rejected the SEU test because the test presupposes a
degree of freedom in a subsidiary's behavior, depending upon the
extent of the parent's control. According to the majority, the unity
of purpose between a corporation and its subsidiary remains intact
no matter how much freedom the subsidiary enjoys. Even if a sub-
sidiary enjoys separate headquarters and separate officers who exer-
cise day-to-day control, "the parent may assert full control at any
moment if the subsidiary fails to act in the parent's best
interests." 08
The Court acknowledged that its new ruling would render par-
ent and subsidiary anticompetitive behavior not rising to the level of
monopolistic market control immune from the Sherman Act's
prohibitions, but the Court denied that this would leave an imper-
missible void between sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.10 9 The
Court observed that the same result follows if one company wield-
ing the same market power as a parent and subsidiary restrains trade
below the amount section 2 proscribes. 110 The Court concluded
that Congress intended to leave a gap between sections 1 and 2 of
105 Id. at 769-71. For the incapacity of officers and employees of the same firm to
conspire in contravention of § 1, the Court cited, among other cases, Schwimmer v.
Sony Corp. of Am., 677 F.2d 946, 953 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1007 (1982); Tose
v. First Pa. Bank, N.A., 648 F.2d 879, 893-94 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981).
Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769 & n.15. For the lack of conspiratorial capacity between a
corporation and one of its unincorporated divisions, the Court cited Cliff Food Stores,
Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 205-06 (5th Cir. 1969);Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v.
Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 83-84 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1062 (1970); Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 284 F.2d 599, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1960),
rev'd on other grounds, 368 U.S. 464 (1962). Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 770 n.16; see also supra
notes 54-55.
106 Coppenveld, 467 U.S. at 771.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 771-72. The Court expressly limited its Copperweld holding to a parent's
inability to conspire with its wholly owned subsidiary. Id. at 767. Thus, the Court left
open the possibility of finding a conspiracy between a parent and a partially owned affili-
ate. See infra text accompanying notes 173-78 for a discussion of the SEU test in cases
of less than total ownership.
109 467 U.S. at 775.
110 Id.
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the Sherman Act. 1 '
The majority reasoned further that Congress intended to treat
concerted activity differently from unilateral conduct. 112 Congress
realized that a conspiracy between actors raises anticompetitive dan-
gers distinct from those created by the unilateral exertion of nega-
tive market power. Because the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine
"obliterate[s] the ... distinction between unilateral and concerted
conduct, contrary to the clear intent of Congress," 113 the Court re-
jected it.
The Court countered the dissent's objection' 14 that significant
antitrust behavior would escape prosecution under the Court's rul-
ing by pointing to other measures filling the gap between sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act.115 Section 1 of the Sherman Act and
section 7 of the Clayton Act always require scrutiny of the initial
acquisition of a subsidiary. 116 Furthermore, section 2 of the Sher-
man Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act hold
the new corporate affiliation accountable for monopolistic behav-
ior. 117 Finally, a plaintiff who cannot utilize any federal remedy
might seek relief under state contract, tort, and criminal
provisions. 18
111 Id. at 775-76.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 776. Another possible reason for the distinction is that natural, competi-
tive unilateral market behavior is difficult to distinguish from improper unilateral
behavior.
114 467 U.S. at 790-91 (Stevens,J., dissenting); see also infra notes 134-35 and accom-
panying text.
115 467 U.S. at 777; see also R. GIVENS, supra note 15, § 16.03, at 16-12 (1984) (agree-
ments with external parties, even if coerced, can trigger § 1 scrutiny).
116 467 U.S. at 777. For the relevant part of § 1 of the Sherman Act, see supra note
2. Section 7 of the Clayton Act reads:
No person engaged in commerce ... shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock.., and no person subject to the juris-
diction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the.., assets of
another person engaged also in commerce .... where in any line of com-
merce or in any activity affecting commerce. . . the effect of such acqui-
sition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
117 467 U.S. at 777. For the relevant part of § 2 of the Sherman Act, see supra note
51. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides, in part: "Unfair methods
of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
118 467 U.S. at 777. The Illinois antitrust statute, for example, states:
Every person shall be deemed to have committed a violation of this Act
who shall:
(1) Make any contract with, or engage in any combination or conspiracy
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D. The Supreme Court Dissent
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dis-
sented.119 Justice Stevens argued that the majority's rejection of the
intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine contravened the principle of
stare decisis,120 the language' 2' and purpose 22 of section 1 of the
Sherman Act, and the sound antitrust policy behind the intraenter-
prise conspiracy doctrine. 123
Justice Stevens's dissent viewed Yellow Cab and its progeny as
strong reasons to uphold the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine in
Copperweld.124 In contrast to the majority's interpretation, the dis-
sent found the Court's previous intraenterprise holdings "plain and
unequivocal"1 25 in their reliance upon the intraenterprise conspir-
acy doctrine rather than upon possible "other grounds."' 126 The
dissent argued that the majority ignored at least seven prior deci-
sions.127 To the dissent, the weight of precedent created a strong
presumption in favor of retaining the intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine.' 28
The dissent argued further that the Sherman Act's language
and legislative history support the intraenterprise conspiracy doc-
trine. After an analysis of the legislative history of section 1, Justice
Stevens concluded that Congress intended the statute to "have a
broad sweep, reaching any form of combination."' 29 The dissent
further observed that the statute was written within a common law
context, and common law conspiracy views corporations as separate
legal entities.' 30
with, any other person who is, or but for a prior agreement would be, a
competitor of such person:
(a) for the purpose [of price fixing];
(b) [for the purpose of fixing the sale or supply of any commodity];
(c) [for the purpose of allocating markets]; or
(2) By contract, combination, or conspiracy with one or more other per-
sons unreasonably restrain trade or commerce ....
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-3 (Smith-Hurd 1985).
119 Justice White took no part in the Copperweld decision. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 778.
120 See infra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
121 See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
122 See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
123 See infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
124 Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 779-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125 Id. at 781 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 782 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that "the Kiefer-Stewarl
Court considered and rejected exactly the same argument embraced by today's major-
ity." Id. at n.4.
127 Id. at 783 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 784 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 785 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 786 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that Congress used the
common law definition of conspiracy when it enacted § I of the Sherman Act. The dis-
sent further stated that the law of conspiracy holds officers of a single corporation capa-
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The dissenting opinion contends that the majority's holding is
inconsistent with the Sherman Act's underlying concern,1 3 1 namely,
trusts consisting of affiliated corporations. 32 Of these affiliated cor-
porations, "the corporate subsidiary, when used as a device to elimi-
nate competition, was one of the chief evils to which the Sherman
Act was addressed." 133 The dissent therefore viewed the majority's
holding in Copperweld as violating both express and implied congres-
sional purposes behind the Sherman Act.
The dissent also criticized the elimination of the intraenterprise
conspiracy doctrine on policy grounds. Justice Stevens agreed with
the majority that conduct between affiliated corporations that "is
merely an incident of the desirable integration that accompanies
such affiliation"13 4 poses no threat. Justice Stevens took issue, how-
ever, with the majority's treatment of affiliated corporate conduct
which unreasonably restrains trade. The dissent reasoned that
courts should invoke section 1 against such conduct because failure
to do so would leave "a significant gap in the enforcement of § 1
with respect to anticompetitive conduct that is entirely unrelated to
the efficiencies associated with integration."'' 3 5
III
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court responded in Copperweld to the legitimate
criticism that the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine, by focusing on
the formal incident of separate incorporation and ignoring eco-
nomic and business reality, elevates form over substance.136 The
Court's response, however, went too far in the other direction. By
completely overruling the doctrine as applied to parents and their
ble of conspiring with each other or the corporation. Id. This definition of conspiracy
goes too far, however, in the context of antitrust law. Given that courts applying § 1
have consistently rejected such an extreme application of the statute, see supra note 55
and accompanying text, the dissent's definition of conspiracy fails to explain why the
Court should not further limit antitrust conspiracy by excluding combinations between
corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries.
131 Id. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132 The dissent quoted Senator Sherman: "The combination is always of two or
more.., corporations, all bound together by a link which holds them under the name of
trustees, who are themselves incorporated under the laws of one of the States." Id.
(quoting 21 CoNG. REC. 2569 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman)).
133 Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
134 Id. at 789 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "[A]ffiliation of corporate entities often is
procompetitive precisely because, as the [majority] explains, it enhances efficiency." Id.
135 Id. The dissent failed to clarify the distinction between conduct that is merely
incident to desirable integration and affiliated corporate conduct that unreasonably re-
strains trade. Presumably the dissent would view all anticompetitive corporate conduct
as subject to § 1 scrutiny. Under this view, if no anticompetitive effects occur the con-
duct would never be questioned.
136 See bifra note 140 and accompanying text.
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wholly owned subsidiaries, the Court again disregarded complex
economic relationships in favor of examining corporate form.1 37
Nonetheless, the Court left open the possibility that lower courts
may apply the SEU analysis in cases of less than total subsidiary
ownership.138 Such an approach by lower courts would comport
with the majority's underlying goal to permit substance to ascend
above form by exempting corporations with a unity of purpose from
section 1 scrutiny. 139
A. The Supreme Court's Rejection of the Intraenterprise
Conspiracy Doctrine
The Copperweld Court correctly perceived the conflict between
the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine's focus on the legal status of
a corporation and the Sherman Act's concern for economic reali-
ties. 140 Under a rigorous construction of the intraenterprise con-
spiracy doctrine, concerted activity between a parent and a
subsidiary might qualify as a conspiracy, while the same activity per-
formed unilaterally by a corporation and one of its divisions would
not. The unincorporated division analogy demonstrates an inher-
ent flaw in the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine: Copperweld
could have escaped section 1 liability by operating Regal as an unin-
corporated division. Regal's separate incorporation did not render
the parent and subsidiary more able to conspire. Copperweld could
have been equally effective in intimidating Independence's suppliers
if Regal had remained an unincorporated division.
The Court's decision to discard the intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine responded too zealously to the doctrine's flaw. After Cop-
perweld, a corporation is incapable of conspiring with its wholly
owned subsidiary as a matter of law. The response commits the
same mistake as the doctrine it overrules-it elevates form over sub-
stance. Under Copperweld, the capacity of a parent and its subsidiary
truly to conspire is no longer relevant; if total ownership exists, for
antitrust purposes the corporations are deemed to be incapable of
conspiring.
The Copperweld rule assumes the general proposition that a
complete unity of interest exists between a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary. This premise is valid only if the parent-subsidiary
relationship precludes independent action by a subsidiary. If a
137 See infra notes 141-51 and accompanying text.
138 See infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
139 See infra text accompanying notes 173-74.
140 The Yellow Cab Court noted that the Sherman Act is "aimed at substance rather
than form." 332 U.S. at 227 (echoing similar observation made in Appalachian Coals,
Inc. v. United States: "The restrictions the Act imposes are not mechanical or artificial."
288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933)).
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wholly owned subsidiary can take independent action, then a parent
and a subsidiary can meaningfully conspire. Thus, the Copperweld
majority's total rejection of the doctrine is ill-advised unless in-
dependent action by a wholly owned subsidiary is not possible.
B. The Independence of a Wholly Owned Corporate
Subsidiary
The Copperweld Court asserted that "a parent and a wholly
owned subsidiary always have a 'unity of purpose or a common de-
sign.' "141 The Court reasoned that even if the parent encourages
the subsidiary to act freely, it may reassert full control if the subsidi-
ary fails to act in the parent's best interests. 142 Thus, a unity of pur-
pose exists whether or not the parent keeps "a tight rein" over the
subsidiary.
Professor Phillip Areeda, a noted antitrust commentator and
critic of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine, similarly distin-
guishes between acting in agreement with another entity, which
gives rise to section 1 liability, and acting at the direction of that
entity, which does not.143 Professor Areeda notes that the concept
of agreement implies a notion of choice. 144 He argues that a subsid-
iary does not have such freedom of choice for four reasons. First, a
parent would only instruct its subsidiary to act independently if it
believed that this directive would promote efficient operation. Such
a grant of independence, however, implies that the subsidiary must
coordinate with the parent when beneficial to the parent; hence the
subsidiary's freedom is illusory. Second, the grant can be qualified
or repealed by practice or tacit understanding. Thus, a parent that
periodically instructs or agrees with its subsidiary surreptitiously
modifies its previous instruction. 45 Third, one cannot reasonably
presume that parents would intend a delegation of independence to
be so categorical as to create antitrust liability.' 46 Finally, denying
coordinated conduct between parent and subsidiary negates the
very conspiracy at issue. As Professor Areeda states, "There can be
141 Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771 (emphasis in original) (quoting American Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946)).
142 Id. at 771-72.
143 See Areeda, supra note 19, at 467. The Copperweld majority cited Professor
Areeda's article twice, 467 U.S. 766 n.12, 773 n.20, and adopted his views in support of
its holding. Professor Areeda perspicaciously noted in his article that the Supreme
Court had accepted certiorari in Copperweld, "affordling] itself an opportunity to reas-
scss, in light of the proper objectives of antitrust law, the deleterious and anomalous
consequences of its scattered pronouncements on intraenterprise conspiracy." Areeda.
supra note 19, at 452.
144 Areeda, sipra note 19, at 470-7 1.
145 Id. at 467.
146 Id.
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no effective agreement without coordinated action. Proof of such
coordination, however, simultaneously proves active integration be-
tween a parent and its subsidiary." 147
Professor Areeda's arguments err in treating direction and
choice as absolutes. The concept of freedom is relative, even in the
context of complete corporate ownership. A parent's direction
need not totally control its subsidiary; rather, a corporate subsidiary
may possess a degree of freedom dependent on the extent of dele-
gated decisionmaking authority. Addressing each of Professor
Areeda's four arguments will demonstrate that the independence
enjoyed by a corporate subsidiary is not an "all or nothing"
proposition.
Professor Areeda first argues that a grant of independence
might implicitly require that the subsidiary coordinate with its par-
ent when beneficial to the parent. Yet a parent might place sufficient
value on its subsidiary's independence to outweigh the discrete ben-
efit derived from particular coordinated action. For example, the
parent might decide that operating its subsidiaries independently
induces subsidiary managers to perform well and increase their re-
sponsibility and freedom accordingly. The parent accepts occa-
sional losses incurred when joint action would have proved more
profitable, but reaps an aggregate gain from its subsidiaries' in-
creased productivity. Coordinated action could still occur, but not
as a result of an implicit command.
Second, Professor Areeda notes that a parent may tacitly or
overtly qualify or repeal a previous grant of subsidiary autonomy.
On the other hand, the parent could grant independence by more
formal means. For example, the subsidiary's articles of incorpora-
tion or by-laws might include provisions such as the staggering of
board members' terms to discourage complete reelection of the
board of directors.1 48 Such procedures slow the process whereby a
parent brings its previously independent subsidiary back into the
corporate fold. The parent would only attempt to regain control if
it believed that the detrimental impact of the subsidiary's actions
outweighed the advantages derived from subsidiary independence.
Even if the parent repealed its delegation of independence, deci-
sions made during the period of subsidiary freedom would still re-
tain their independent character.
147 Id. at 467.
148 Shareholders cannot remove management until a majority of the directors have
been reelected. Although staggering board members' terms might appear detrimental
to the parent, and therefore unlikely to be approved, it is plausible in the context of
merger agreements. Target corporations wary of losing control to their new parents
often exact guarantees of independence in return for approving the articles of merger.
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Third, Professor Areeda presumes that parents would rarely al-
low their subsidiaries to exercise sufficient independence to risk an-
titrust liability. However, they may inadvertently do so. A parent
wishing to give its subsidiary free reign might not recognize the
threat of antitrust liability. Although corporations cannot predict
when antitrust liability might arise, they nonetheless are liable if
their conduct strays over the threshold of impermissibility. 149
Finally, Professor Areeda argues that a section 1 conspiracy re-
quires coordinated action, and that the presence of coordinated ac-
tion indicates active integration between a subsidiary and its parent.
Yet proof of such coordination does not necessarily demonstrate
unity between a parent and its subsidiary.150 A parent corporation
can permit independent action by its subsidiary without obviating
the possibility of joint action on mutually beneficial matters. To as-
sert that agreement necessarily implies control begs the question.
The real issue is whether a wholly owned subsidiary possessing a
grant of independence has sufficient freedom to choose to agree
with its parent. Furthermore, section 1 conspiracy can exist when
the agreement is less than an explicit "meeting of minds." 151
149 See Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913), in which the Court upheld a
Sherman Act criminal indictment against a defense of statutory vagueness. Writing for
the majority, Justice Holmes recognized that the statutory crime "contains in its defini-
tion an element of degree as to which estimates may differ, with the result that a man
might find himself in prison because his honest judgment did not anticipate that of a
jury of less competent men." Id. at 376. But see International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky,
234 U.S. 216, 223-24 (1914) (Justice Holmes, again writing for Court, distinguished
Nash and struck down state antitrust statute containing unconstitutionally vague term
"real value" because "the elements necessary to determine the imaginary ideal are un-
certain both in nature and degree of effect to the acutest commercial mind.").
150 Professor Areeda points to Triebwasser & Katz v. AT&T, 1976-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 60,769 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 1356 (2d Cir. 1976), to illus-
trate the nexus between conspiracy and integration. Areeda, supra note 19, at 467-68.
In Triebwasser, the court held AT&T capable of conspiring with a wholly owned subsidi-
ary to refuse to publish certain types of advertisements in the local yellow pages. Profes-
sor Areeda notes that the court explicitly rested its holding on the parent's claim that the
subsidiary was free to accept or reject any national AT&T policy on the matter in dis-
pute. Professor Areeda argues that "if the subsidiary was free to act as it pleased, its
definition of acceptable advertising matter would not have reflected a conspiracy with
anyone." Areeda, supra note 19, at 468. This is not necessarily true. The subsidiary
might have agreed with AT&T's yellow pages policy and formalized the agreement to
serve some ulterior motive. Professor Areeda's assertion also encounters difficulty
outside the context of vertical integration. When a parent and subsidiary engage in
totally different types of business, agreements ancillary to the corporations' chief busi-
ness are less likely to indicate control. If the parent's business differs in type from its
subsidiary's, the parent will have less inclination to coerce its subsidiary into operating
according to the parent's guidelines.
151 See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939) ("It
is elementary that an unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed without simultane-
ous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators.").
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C. The Single Economic Unit Test as Applied to the
Independence of Corporate Subsidiaries
Given that subsidiaries can be sufficiently independent to mean-
ingfully conspire with their parents, determining whether that inde-
pendence exists in a particular case turns on several factors. For
example, a court might consider the common ownership, control,
and management of the two firms in question. 152 However, a court
deciding whether a parent and its subsidiary are truly capable of
conspiring must consider more concrete factors in order to make a
proper determination. Prior to Copperweld, courts responded to this
problem by formulating the single economic unit test. The SEU test
considers such factors as: the unity of directors, officers, employees,
offices, and corporate headquarters between the two firms; the par-
ent's power to control its subsidiary; and the amount of control ac-
tually exercised.1 53 Although the SEU test acknowledges the
possibility of collusion between a parent and its wholly owned sub-
sidiary and therefore directly conflicts with the majority's holding in
Copperweld, the test is actually closer to Copperweld's view of conspira-
torial capacity than to the Yellow Cab view.' 54
The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits developed the SEU
test to mitigate the harsh formalism of the intraenterprise conspir-
152 See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 326 (1977). Professor
Sullivan also argues that the historical integration of the two firms is relevant. Id. at 326-
27. He notes that in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951),
the Court refused to treat two corporations with partially common ownership as a single
firm partly because each had a history of independent existence and competition. L.
SULLIVAN, supra, at 328.
Logically, an intraenterprise conspiracy test that ignores common corporate owner-
ship and examines parental control over a subsidiary could lead to a finding of § I con-
spiracy between a corporation and its unincorporated division. Indeed, one court
reached such a result. See Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
272 F. Supp. 915 (D. Haw. 1967), rev'd, 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1062 (1970). Professor Sullivan addresses this situation and notes that "[s]o far as effect
on competition is concerned, the issues are not different from those pertaining to a
corporation and its employees or a parent and its subsidiary." L. SULLIVAN, supra, at
328-29. Professor Sullivan continues, however, "[blut when we have two divisions of
one corporation instead of two corporations, it is hard to see that there are present the
two legal persons needed for a conspiracy." L. SULLIVAN, supra, at 329.
Courts could extend substantive intraenterprise analysis to employees of a corpora-
tion acting within the scope of their employment. To do so, however, would make it
impossible for a corporation to conduct its affairs because, it can only act through its
officers and employees. See ATrORNEY GEN. NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAws, REPORT 30-31 (1955). Courts recognize that a corporation and its employee have
conspiratorial capacity when the employee acts on his own behalf. See H & B Equip. Co.
v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting but declining
to apply exception).
153 See supra notes 56-75 and accompanying text.
154 See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
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acy doctrine. 155 Although these courts recognized that Yellow Cab
and its progeny were controlling precedent, 156 they argued that the
Supreme Court "ha[d] not foreclosed a single enterprise defense to
section 1 liability for related, although separately incorporated,
companies."' 157 These circuits expressly sought to negate rigid ap-
plication of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine because it com-
pelled finding capacity to conspire in the legal form of two
corporations rather than in the economic substance of their
relationship.
Most decisions applying the SEU test prior to Copperweld found
no capacity to conspire. 158 This pattern further demonstrates con-
geniality between the SEU test and Copperweld's concern with elevat-
ing form over substance.
IV
THE FUTURE OF THE INTRAENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY
DOCTRINE
Under Copperweld, courts may no longer hold corporations with
common ownership capable of conspiring in violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act. By foreclosing a case by case analysis into
whether capacity to conspire exists, this blanket rule commits the
same error as the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine it overrules.
The Copperweld holding may nonetheless have its advantages.
One apparent advantage of the Copperweld Court's approach is
its ease of application: courts need not undertake detailed analyses
of economic relationships in order to determine whether conspira-
torial capacity is present. Henceforth, courts will regard commonly
owned corporations as united, regardless of their separate legal in-
corporation, and thereby deem them outside the grasp of section 1
155 See supra notes 56-75 and accompanying text.
156 See, e.g., Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581, 587 (8th Cir. 1981) ("We must
start with the Supreme Court's repeated statements that related corporations, because
legally distinct, may be capable of conspiracy.").
157 Id. at 588. The Eighth Circuit stated, "We believe a holding that the formality of
separate incorporation forecloses such a defense elevates form over substance in a man-
ner inconsistent with the intent of the antitrust laws." Id. (footnote omitted).
158 The Ninth Circuit either held, or indicated that it would hold were the issue not
moot, that the defendant corporations were incapable of conspiring in Las Vegas Sun,
Harvey, Mutual Fund, and Knutson. See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text. Simi-
larly, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits declined to find conspiratorial capacity in Ogilvie
and Photovest, respectively. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text. The only pre-
Copperweld application of the SEU test finding capacity to conspire is Murphy Tugboat
Co. v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., 467 F. Supp. 841, 859 (N.D. Cal. 1979)
(commonly owned and controlled corporations historically separate and competitive
deemed liable for illegal boycott agreement which each pursued independently), aff'd,
658 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982).
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liability. 159
Furthermore, corporate enterprises may now operate freely,
without fear of section 1 liability for acting in unison within the en-
terprise. Efficiency should increase because parents can now avail
themselves of the legitimate benefits of separate subsidiary incorpo-
ration 160 without first weighing the benefits against potential anti-
trust liability.
Although the Copperweld rule is easily applied to parents and
wholly owned subsidiaries, its simplicity is illusory because the
Supreme Court expressly limited its holding to cases involving
wholly owned subsidiaries. 16 1 The decision does not address situa-
tions involving less than total ownership; hence, lower courts have
no guidance in such circumstances.1 6 2
Three possible interpretations of Copperweld are possible re-
garding the application of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine to
cases of less than total ownership. The first interprets the Copperweld
language to suggest that the Court only overruled the intraenter-
prise conspiracy doctrine in the context of wholly owned subsidiar-
ies. 163 Second, the Court's discussion of parent-subsidiary unity of
purpose might indicate that the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine
is also overruled whenever parents control their subsidiaries. 164 Fi-
nally, one might interpret the Court's underlying rationale to imply
that when ownership is less than total, lower courts are free to apply
the single economic unit test to determine whether meaningful
159 See, e.g., Hood v. Tenneco Tex. Life Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1984)
(Copperweld forecloses § 1 liability between two wholly owned subsidiaries of common
parent); Century Oil Tool, Inc. v. Production Specialties, Inc., 737 F.2d 1316, 1316-17
(5th Cir. 1984) (Copperweld forecloses § 1 liability between two corporations commonly
owned and managed by three individuals).
160 The Copperweld Court acknowledged that "[sleparate incorporation may improve
management, avoid special tax problems arising from multistate operations, or serve
other legitimate interests." 467 U.S. at 772-73. For example, it may serve to reduce
state and federal taxes, facilitate compliance with regulatory or reporting laws, increase
a corporation's identification with a locality, appeal to investors with particularized inter-
ests, and permit separate accounting, profit-sharing, and pension plan arrangements. Id.
at 773 n.20 (citing Areeda, supra note 19, at 453).
161 "We do not consider under what circumstances, if any, a parent may be liable for
conspiring with an affiliated corporation it does not completely own." 467 U.S. at 767.
162 Despite the Copperweld Court's insistence that it did not consider "under what
circumstances, if any, a parent may be liable for conspiring with an affiliated corporation
it does not completely own," id., the Fifth Circuit utilized Coppenveld's reasoning to
demonstrate the impropriety of a per se standard with respect to agreements between
insurance companies with no common ownership. Plueckhahn v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
749 F.2d 241, 245 (5th Cir.) ("unity of purpose" among commonly owned corporations
forecloses horizontal competition needed for per se violation), ceri. denied, 105 S. Ct.
3527 (1985). In Plueckhahn, the court found the defendant's restrictive employment pol-
icy legal under a rule of reason analysis. Id. at 246-47.
163 See infra text accompanying note 166.
164 See infra text accompanying notes 167-72.
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capacity to conspire exists. 165 This Note endorses the third
interpretation.
A. Copperweld's Application Limited to Wholly Owned
Subsidiaries
Under the first interpretation, Copperweld's express limitation to
the complete ownership setting implies that parents and their less
than wholly owned subsidiaries are fully capable of conspiring. The
final paragraph in the majority's opinion buttresses this analysis.
There, the Court states, "To the extent that prior decisions of this
Court are to the contrary, they are disapproved and overruled."1 66
Under this interpretation, Copperweld only overrules that portion of
Yellow Cab and its progeny which holds that parents cannot conspire
with their wholly owned subsidiaries. With less than total owner-
ship, however, the line of precedent upholding the intraenterprise
conspiracy doctrine still applies, thus permitting a finding of capac-
ity to conspire.
Although initially plausible, this interpretation of Copperweld's
holding ignores both the decision's express limitation and its ration-
ale. The majority explicitly narrowed its holding to cases of total
ownership and left open the intraenterprise liability issue in cases of
less than total ownership. 167 This precludes concluding that the in-
traenterprise doctrine automatically applies to cases of less than
complete ownership. One might as easily argue that the Court
meant to overrule the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine, whatever
the degree of parental control.
In addition, the Copperweld Court's rationale is inconsistent with
the view that less than total ownership negates the capacity to con-
spire. The majority presumed that a parent and its wholly owned
subsidiary have a complete unity of interest.1 68 This unity of inter-
est stems from the parent's power to "assert full control at any mo-
ment if the subsidiary fails to act in the parent's best interests."' 69
This ability, however, is no less present when a parent owns less
than all the subsidiary's stock, but still enough to exert control. In
many instances, ownership of a simple majority of a corporation's
outstanding shares entitles the stockholder to direct all corporate
activities.170 Often a shareholder with a small plurality of shares has
working control of a widely-held corporation. Therefore, presum-
165 See infra text accompanying notes 173-78.
166 Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 777 (emphasis added).
167 See supra note 161.
168 467 U.S. at 777; see also supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
169 467 U.S. at 771-72.
170 This assumes that the articles of incorporation and their by-laws do not require a
super-majority shareholder vote in order to elect the board of directors.
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ing that less than total ownership permits a finding of capacity to
conspire is entirely inconsistent with the Court's holding in Cop-
perweld if the facts show control exists.
B. Copperweld's Application to Controlled Subsidiaries
An alternate interpretation of Copperweld is that a corporation is
incapable of conspiring as long as it is controlled by a shareholder,
even when ownership is less than complete. Indeed, petitioner
Copperweld urged the Court to rule that a finding of capacity is pre-
cluded "whenever a parent owns more than 50% of a subsidi-
ary. '"171 As noted above, this is entirely consistent with the
majority's rationale. Typically, a parent owning 100% of a subsidi-
ary enjoys no greater control over its subsidiary than a parent own-
ing 51%.172 Therefore, the rationale underlying the majority's
decision apparently overrules the intraenterprise conspiracy doc-
trine in all cases where common ownership or control exists.
In practice, however, automatically extending the Copperweld
holding to cases of less than total ownership would further elevate
form over substance by ignoring the possible independence of the
subsidiary. For example, a parent owning a majority of its subsidi-
ary's stock might permit cumulative voting for directors 173 and take
a passive role in the subsidiary's management, thus permitting mi-
nority shareholders to elect one or more directors and effectively
run the corporation. If applied, Copperweld would foreclose section 1
liability even though the passive parent could meaningfully conspire
with the minority-run subsidiary. At the other extreme, a parent
which barely owns a plurality of a corporation's stock might effec-
tively control it if the other shareholders are sufficiently dispersed
and disinterested. Here, Copperweld would permit a finding of collu-
sion, even though only one economic interest is truly represented.
Thus, as noted above, 174 unity of purpose actually turns on the eco-
nomic realities of the enterprise in question. Moreover, the nature
171 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Jan. 28, 1983, Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752
(1984).
172 The larger percentage of ownership gives the parent an increased equity stake in
the subsidiary and eliminates minority shareholders to whom the parent would have
obligations, such as permitting inspection of corporate records and otherwise respecting
fiduciary duties. These differences, however, do not reflect a greater ability to direct the
subsidiary's behavior. But see supra note 170.
173 Regular voting allows shareholders to vote all shares for each director. Cumula-
tive voting enables minority shareholders to elect at least one director by cumulating
votes for each seat on the board. While a minority shareholder can never elect a major-
ity of the board, the power to elect one or more directors enables the shareholder to
exercise greater control over corporate decisions than if voting were noncumulative. See
generally R. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 375-76 (2d ed. 1981).
174 See supra notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
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of control is particularly crucial in the context of less than total cor-
porate ownership because the extent of ownership may vary. The
parent's ability to exert control decreases and its ability to delegate
control increases when its degree of ownership lessens. Therefore,
applying the Copperweld holding to majority controlled and wholly
owned corporations and their parents is improper.
C. Copperweld Permits Utilizing the Single Economic Unit Test
in Cases of Less Than Total Subsidiary Ownership
Given the inadequacies of these two derivations of the Cop-
perweld holding, the third and best interpretation incorporates the
SEU test in cases of less than total ownership. This interpretation is
consistent with both the language and rationale of the Court's opin-
ion. It comports with the language in Copperweld because the major-
ity left open the intraenterprise conspiracy issue between a parent
and a less than wholly owned subsidiary. 175 The Court found the
SEU test inadequate because the test analyzes the extent of unity
between parent and subsidiary-an inquiry rendered superfluous by
the Court's premise that total ownership implies unity of pur-
pose. 176 The Court expressly rejected the SEU test "[a]s applied to
a wholly owned subsidiary."'' 77 The Court further observed, "At least
when a subsidiary is wholly owned, [the SEU factors] are not suffi-
cient to describe a separate economic entity for purposes of the
Sherman Act."' 178 Thus, the Court rejected the SEU test only in the
context of complete subsidiary ownership, implying that it might ap-
ply to less than complete ownership.
Finally, this third interpretation is consistent with the rationale
behind the majority's holding. The SEU test determines whether
unity of purpose in fact exists. Lower courts should continue to ap-
ply the SEU test, examining factors to discover whether a parent has
sufficient control over its subsidiary to prevent the latter from acting
freely. Such control is a necessary predicate to parental capacity to
conspire with a subsidiary. Lower courts would thereby serve the
Copperweld majority's professed desire to elevate economic substance
over legal form.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court ruled in Copperweld that, as a matter of law,
a parent corporation is incapable of conspiring with its wholly
owned subsidiary in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Cop-
175 See supra note 161.
176 See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
177 467 U.S. at 772 n.18 (emphasis added).
178 Id. (emphasis added).
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perweld reversed a line of Supreme Court cases treating separately
incorporated corporations as unique legal entities fully capable of
conspiring. In reaching its decision, the Copperweld Court claimed to
elevate substance over form, arguing that a parent necessarily con-
trols its wholly owned subsidiary and that the two corporations have
a unity of purpose. The Court's holding correctly overruled the in-
traenterprise conspiracy doctrine derived from Yellow Cab and its
progeny. Just as the doctrine it criticizes, however, the Court's deci-
sion also elevates substance over form by ignoring the parent's abil-
ity to delegate control to such a degree that the two corporations
can meaningfully conspire. The Court limited its holding to the
context of total ownership, yet provided no explicit guidelines to
lower courts applying section 1 to corporations with less than com-
plete ownership. This Note proposes that lower courts apply the
SEU test in such circumstances. Furthermore, the SEU test com-
ports with the underlying message of the majority's decision: to ex-
amine economic realities rather than legal formalities. Instead of
eliminating the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine, Copperweld only
limits its application to cases of less than total ownership where two
corporations lack the requisite unity of purpose.
Owen T. Prell
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